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CAamts--LmrrATIoN oF Lxumrny F0a NEGLw mNC---CamACKr Aimzm-
MENT.-Cattle were shipped by railroad under the "Uniform Live-Stock Agree-
ment" by which, in consideration of a reduced rate, it was agreed that in the
event of negligent delay or detention damages should be limited to the amount
actually expended by the shipper in the purchase of food and water for the
cattle while so detained. Suit was brought for loss arising from negligent
delay. Held, that the attempted limitation of liability for negligence was
invalid under the Carmack Amendment Boston & Maine R. R. Co. v. Piper
(1x8, U. S.) 38 Sup. Ct 354.
The case apparently arose before the adoption of the latest amendments to
the Interstate Commerce Act, by which, in the case of "ordinary live-stock,"
all contracts of any kind attempting to limit liability are forbidden. See Act
March 4, 1915, 38 U. S. St. at L. ix96, and Act Aug. 9, i916, 39 U. S. St. at L
44I. It is chiefly interesting as showing that the court was not disposed to
extend the agreed valuation doctrine of Adams Express Co. v. Croninger (1913)
226 U. S. 492, 33 Sup. Ct. 148, and other later decisions, which, as applied to
cases of negligence, was said in Wells Fargo & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co.
(913) 227 U. S. 469, 476; 33 Sup. Ct. 267, 269, to rest on estoppel. There
was clearly no basis for estoppel in the principal case.
CvIL RIGHT s-RAcE DiSCRmiNATioN-PLAcEs OP Pumuc ACCOMMODATION.-
Section 4o of the Civil Rights Law of New York forbids discrimination on
account of race or color at any "place of public accommodation, resort, or
amusement." The law defines such a place as including hotels, restaurants,
public conveyances, and several other places, but makes no mention of saloons.
The plaintiff, a negro, was refused liquors at a saloon belonging to the
defendant, the refusal being due solely to the plaintiff's color. He sued for
the penalty in accordance with other provisions in the statute. Held, three
judges dissenting, that he had no cause of action. Gibbs v. Arras Bros. (1918,
N. Y.) i18 N. . 857.
The plaintiff, a negro, sought to purchase tickets to the floor of a dancing
pavilion maintained at a park owned and operated by the defendant electric
railroad company as auxiliary to its transportation business. On account of
his color he was denied admittance. The Civil Rights Law makes no express
mention of dancing pavilions. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to the
penalty provided by the law for exclusion from a place of public accommoda-
tion, resort or amusement. Johnson v. Auburn & Syracuse Elec. R. Co. (1918,
N. Y.) ii9 N. E. 72.
These cases give a reasonable construction to a statute that exists in rffost
of the Northern states. If the legislature means to forbid race discrimination
in every sort of private business, it should do so expressly, When the statute
list certain places, as hotels, bathhouses, barber shops, theaters and music halls,
the courts should not extend the application of the law to other sorts of busi-
ness by mere analogy or inference. Such a law deprives citizens.of customary
and desirable privileges. Sound policy would restrict such laws to the kinds
of business long recognized as affected with public interest and as requiring
governmental regulation.
CoxsrnuTnoNAL LAw-FEDERAL CHm LAwOR LAw INvALm.-Suit was
brought by a father in his own behalf and as next friend of his two minor
sons, one under the age of fourteen and the other between fourtee4 and six-
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teen years of age, employees in a cotton mill at Charlotte, N. C., to enjoin the
enforcement of the Federal Child Labor Law (39 St. at L. 675) which prohibits
the shipment in interstate commerce of any product of a mill, factory, etc., in
the United States, in which within thirty days before the removal of such
product children under the age of fourteen have been employed, or children
between fourteen and sixteen have been employed more than eight hours in
a day, or more than six days in any week, or between seven in the evening
and six in the morning. Held, that the Act was invalid, since "it not only
transcends the authority delegated to Congress over commerce but also exerts
a power as to a purely local matter to which the federal authority does not
extend." Holmes, McKenna, Brandeis and Clarke, JJ., dissenting. Hammer v.
Dagenhart (June 3, i918) U. S. Sup. Ct Oct 1917 Term, No. 704.
Mr. Justice Day's opinion distinguishes the earlier decisions which were
thought to be controlling, such as the Lottery case, the Pure Food case, the
White Slave case, the Whiskey case, on the ground that "in each of these
instances the use of interstate transportation was necessary to the accom-
plishment of harmful results," while here "the goods shipped are of them-
selves harmless" and the thing intended and affected by the statute is not the
regulating of transportation among the states but the standardizing of the
ages at which children may be employed in manufacturing and mining within
the states. One cannot read the luminous dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Holmes without doubting the soundness of this distinction and questioning the
wisdom of the majority's view that legislative motive and the indirect effects
of legislation may limit the exercise by Congress of its admitted power to
regulate commerce.
CONTRACTS-CONTRACT To BFQUEATH-AcTiox AT LAW FOR DXmAGEs.-The
plaintiff sued in the federal court for the southern district of New York the
executors of L, alleging a promise by L to bequeath her $5o,ooo if she would
perform certain services, that she had performed them, and that L had
bequeathed her only $io,ooo. The District Judge transferred the suit to the
equity side of the court on the ground that an action at law could not be
sustained by New York law. The plaintiff filed a. petition for mandamus to
require the judge to entertain the suit at law. Held, that the petitioner was
entitled to a writ of mandamus, since the law of New York permits an action
at law for breach of a contract to leave a legacy. Matter of Simons (June 3,
I9r8) U. S. Sup. Ct Oct 1917 Term, No. 26 Original.
For a discussion of testamentary contracts, see (i918) 27 YALE LAW
JoURNAL, 542.
CORPORATIONS-STOcK-SHARES ISSUED FOR CoNsIDERATIoN LESS TiAN PAR
VALUE Vom.-The constitution of Oklahoma forbids any corporation to issue
stock except "for money, labor done, or property actually received to the
amount of the par value thereof, and all fictitious increase of stock... shall
be void." A stockholder in an Oklahoma corporation filed a bill in equity
asking cancellation of certain certificates of stock, alleging that they had been
issued in violation of this provision. It appeared at the trial that they had
been issued in good faith for only forty per cent of the par value, which was
all that could be obtained at the time. A portion of the "shares" had been
transferred by the original holder to a bona fide purchaser for value. Held,
that the shares issued in violation of the provision were absolutely void, even
in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value, and that the certificates should
therefore be cancelled. Lee v. Cameron (1917, Okla.) i69 Pac. 17.
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The court calls attention to the fact that in a large number of states the
constitutional provision merely requires the stock to be issued for money or
property, but does not, .as in Oklahoma, require that the value received shall
equal the par value of the stock Decisions which hold that under provisions
of that kind stock issued in good .faith is valid, are therefore not in point inOklahoma. The application of the rule to the bona fide purchaser for value
may at first sight seem harsh, but the court leaves open the question of
whether he would have an action for damages against the corporation or its
officers, merely deciding that he is not entitled to retain his stock certificates
or to have his name remain on the list of stockholders. The decision seems
to carry out the obvious intention of the framers of the Oklahoma constitu-
tion.
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-RIGHT TO SFv-INSTALAvTION OF MACHINERY NOT
LOCAL BuslmEss.-A Pennsylvania manufacturing corporation contracted with
residents of Texas for the sale of an ice plant which was to be shipped from
Pennsylvania, installed in Texas under the supervision of the seller's superin-
tendent, and tested by him before the purchasers were obliged to accept it.
The corporation, having performed its part of the contract, brought suit for
the contract price, and was met by -a plea that it had transacted business in
Texas without having obtained a permit therefor and hence under Texas
statutes was not authorized to prosecute its suit. Held, that the suit was
maintainable, since the installation of the machinery was incidental to its sale
in interstate commerce. Pitney, J., dissenting. York Mfg. Co. v. Colley
(1918, U. S.) 38 Sup. Ct 430.
The Texas courts had denied the plaintiff's right to maintain its suit on the
strength of Browing v. Waycross (1914) 233 U. S. 16, 34 Sup. Ct. 578. That
case held that the erection of lightning rods as incidental to an interstate sale
of them was local business. Similarly, it had been held that the installation
of an automatic railway signal system, including the digging of trenches for
conduits for the wires, was local business. General Ry. Sig. Co. v. Virginia(19r8, U. S.) 38 Sup. Ct. 36o. The principal case distinguishes these decisions
on the ground that in them the service to be performed in the foreign state
was not essentially connected with and inherently related to the subject matter
of the sale, while here it was. The distinction is obviously sound but not
always easy of application.
MONOPOLIES-SHERmAN ACT-PRICE-FIXING FOR CERTAIw HouRs OF THE
DAY-By a rule of the Chicago Board of Trade members were forbidden to
buy or offer to buy, during the hours between the closing of one day's session
and the opening of the next, grain "to arrive" in Chicago, that is, grain thenin transit to that city, at a price other than the closing bid of the session.
Purchases of grain "to arrive" constituted a small proportion of the total trans-
actions in grain, the greater part being "spot sales" and "future sales." Held,
that the rule above stated was not in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act. Board of Trade v. United States (igi8, U. -S.) 38 Sup. Ct 242.
This case illustrates very well the operation of the modern and rational con-
struction of the Sherman Act under the principles first enunciated in Standard
Oil Co. v. United States (1911) 221 U. S. i, 31 Sup. Ct 502. The Board of
Trade rule, during the hours of its operation, eliminated all competition
between members of the Board of Trade in respect to prices for grain "to
arrive"; but it affected only a small part of the grain coming to Chicago, left
other important grain markets open to competition, operated only for certain
hours of the day,--chiefly not regular business hours-and the price which it
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fixed for those hours each day was a price established by competitive bidding
on the Board. The court therefore found as the decisive fact that it "had no
appreciable effect on general market prices"; and as good business reasons
appeared for the adoption of the rule, which, within its narrow limits, was
shown to have improved market conditions and even promoted competition
in certain respects enumerated by the court, the decision, sustaining its legality
very properly followed. For other discussions of the "rule of reason" as
applied to the construction of the Sherman Act, see CoMMENTs, p. io6o, supra,
and (1917) 27 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 139.
NEGLiGENcE-CoTRmuToRY NEGuiGNcE OF CHan--CoNsaucrioN OF STAT-
UT-The New Jersey Railroad Law (3 Comp. St. 1910, p. 4245) sec. 55,
declares that if "any person shall be injured by an engine or car while walk-
ing, standing or playing on any railroad," except at lawful crossings, he shall
be deemed to have contributed to the injury sustained and shall not recover
damages. The plaintiff, a boy less than seven years old, had been playing
marbles near a railroad siding and was injured by the moving of a car while
he was trying to extricate his marble from under the car. Held, that the
plaintiff was barred from recovery. Day and Clarke, JJ., dissenting. Erie
R. R. Co. v. Hilt (i918, U. S.) 38 Sup. Ct. 435.
The lower federal courts had construed this statute merely as declaratory
of the common law and not as declaring with sufficient clearness an: intention
to charge children, however immature with contributory negligence. Erie
R. R. Co. v. Swiderski (1912, C. C. A. 3d) i97 Fed. 521. A state court had
taken the opposite view. Barcolini v. Atlantic City, etc. Co. (igii, Sup. Ct.)
82 N. J. I. io7, 8I Atl. 494. The principal case follows the construction of
the state court, although not the court of last resort in the state, and seems
to approve such construction. It appears a rather harsh interpretation of the
statute, and the arguments of the lower federal courts are thought to be more
persuasive.
PUBLIC SERvIcE CoPpoRATioNs-REGULATioN OF RATEs-REGULATION OF
WATER COMPANY WHOSE FRANCHISE HAD ExPnmE.-After the expiration of
the complainant water company's franchise the City of Denver passed an
ordinance declaring the company to be a nere tenant at sufferance and fixing
the rates it should thereafter charge. The company contended that these rates
were confiscatory and sued to enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance. Held,
three judges dissenting, that the company was entitled to an injunction, that
the rate ordinance should be construed as granting a franchise of indefinite
duration, and that in determining the reasonableness of its rates the plant
was to be valued as a plant in use and the item of "going value" was to be
considered. Denver v. Denver Union Water Co. (I918, 'U. S.) 38 Sup. Ct.
278.
The case is of interest both in respect to the holding that the regulatory
ordinance granted a license for an indefinite term, and in respect to the
reaffirmation of the rule that "going value" is an element to be considered
in rate regulation. For a discussion of the latter point, see (igi8) 27 YALE
LAW JoURNAL, 386.
STATUTE OF FRAUDs-PAXoL AGREEMENT wrrH TENANT IN POSSESSION FOR
FtnuE TENAN C-HoLDING Ov.R Am LANDLORD'S REPUDrAmoN.-A land-
lord agreed with the tenant in possession under a lease expiring July 31, 1915,
logs
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for a tenancy in futuro to continue eight months from the expiration of the
original term. But. thereafter, on May 1I, 1915, the landlord made a lease to
other parties and notified the tenant to surrender possession on August ii,
1915. In a suit by the landlord for rent from August Ist to August nth, thie
defendant counterclaimed for damages caused by breach of the parol agree-
ment to extend the lease. Held, that the parol agreement was within the
Statute of Frauds and was not validated by the tenant's possession after the
expiration of the original term because prior thereto it had been repudiated by
the landlord. Buschman Co. v: Garfield Realty Co. (1918, Ohio) irg N. E.
142
When a yearly tenant holds over without any agreement he is presumed to
make a contractual proposal for a yearly tenancy which the landlord accepts
by acquiescing in his possession or by the receipt of rent. When a yearly
tenant holds over lursuant to a prior oral agreement his continued possession
acquiesced in by the landlord, is equivalent to an entry into possession under
the new agreement and takes it out of the Statute of Frauds. Bumiller v.
Walker (917) 95 Oh. St 3447 116 N. E. 797. But if the landlord has already
repudiated the prior oral agreement, as in the principal case, then the tenant's
holding over cannot be treated as a delivery of possession under the new agree-
ment, so as to remove the bar of the Statute. The principal case is believed
to be a sound decision of a point on which there is little precise authority.
STAr uTE OF FRAuDs-PART PERFORMANCE-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF ORAL
CONTRACT RELATING To WATER RIGHTS.-The defendant owned a water right
He orally agreed with the plaintiff that if the latter would rebuild the flume
which carried the water, he would give him a right to one-fourth of the
water and a right of way across the difendant's land for the flow of
the water. Plaintiff rebuilt the flume in pursuance of the agreement and, on
defendant's refusal to carry out the bargain, .asked for specific performance.
Held, that plaintiff was entitled to the relief asked. Tucker v. Kirkpatrick
(i917, .Or.) 169 Pac. n17.
The court took the view that there had been sufficient "part performance"
to "take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds" according to the
Oregon precedents. Apparently the facts in the principal case presented a
novel situation somewhat unlike those involved in previous adjudications.
However, the analogy between what had been done and the situation in the
case of a so-called "parol license" which "becomes irrevocable when acted
upon" by the licensee seems sufficiently close to justify the present decision.
TAXATION-CORPoRATION INCOMz TAX-INcoME DERvED FROM ExorA-
TiN-The plaintiff corporation paid under protest a federal income tax com-
puted upon the net income derived from its business of exporting goods to
foreign countries. It contended that such tax was in violation of Art I, sec.
9, cl. 5 of the Constitution, providing that "no tax or duty shall be laid on
articles exported from any state." Held, that the tax was valid. William E.
Peck & Co. v. Lowe (1918, U. S.) 38 Sup. Ct 432.
While it has been held that the exportation must be free not only from a
tax on the articles exported but also from any tax which directly burdens the
exportation, the tax in question is unlike any of those previously condemned.
It burdens exportation no more directly than do general taxes upon articles
intended for exportation, and these are admittedly valid.
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Wopaxmmys ComPENSATIoN Acr-FAciAL DisruR E .--The claimant
suffered a laceration of the scalp due to the catching of her hair by a revolv-
ing shaft near which she was working. This resulted in a scar across the fore-
head from ear to ear, and serious facial disfigurement. Her earning capacity
was not shown to be impaired thereby. Held, that an award of $xooo by the
State Industrial Commission, for the facial disfigurement alone, was valid.
Erickson v. Presss (xqi8, N. Y.) ii9 N. E. 555.
The object of most compensation acts is to make compensation for loss of
earning power, and such was the policy of the New York law prior to i916,
when an amendment provided for an award in case of "serious facial or head
disfigurement." Concurrent awards for disfigurement and for loss of earn-
ing power are now permissible.
WonMwEN's ComPENsATioN ACT-INz RY "AUSING OUT OF" THE EMPmyov-
mEm4T- CoxcussIox FR0o ExPwSIoN OF ENEMY AiRcpukr's BoMB.-The
plaintiff, a potman in the defendant's employ, being engaged in cleaning a
brass door plate on the street door of the defendant's public house, was
slightly injured by concussion from the explosion in another street of a bomb
dropped by German air raiders. In his suit under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act to recover for the injury sustained, the trial court allowed a recovery.
An appeal by the defendant was allowed by the Court of Appeal on the
ground that, since there was no evidence of special risk in the work the
plaintiff was doing, the injury did not arise out of the employment within
the meaning of the act (1917, C. A.) i44 L. T. iii. The applicant then
appealed to the House of Lords. Held, that the injury did not arise out of
the employment. Allcock v. Rogers (H. L) [i918] Weekly Notes 96; 14
I T. Jour. 4o.
Compensable injuries are those (i) "arising out of" and (2) " in the course
of" the employment Earlier decisions had seemed to render almost indis-
tinguishable these two conditions of liability. See Thorn v. Sinclair [19171
A. C. 127, discussed in (1917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 143; Dennis v. J. A.
White & Co. [1917] A. C. 479, discussed in (igi8) I6 MICE. L. REv., i79; also
(i9i8) 30 Juam. Rxv., x62. The principal case indicates that a distinction does
still exist and that the accident must arise out of, as well as in the course of,
employment to impose liability.
